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Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental illness characterized by high 
rates of engagement in distress-induced risk behavior. Unfortunately, extant 
laboratory-based risk paradigms have failed to account for the role of distress in 
precipitating risk behavior, so many questions remain about processes mechanisms 
that underlie this behavior. The current study examined affect as a moderator of the 
relationship between diagnostic status and risk behavior, as measured by a behavioral 
risk task, and affective and non-affective neurocognitive functioning as potential 
mediators of this relationship. Results indicated that individuals with BPD engaged in 
more risk behavior in the distress condition than in the neutral condition, whereas 
individuals without BPD showed a decrease in risk behavior across the two 
conditions. However, corresponding changes in executive functioning were not 
observed, suggesting the need for continued research to identify alternative 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Borderline Personality Disorder 
 Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe, persistent mental illness 
characterized by marked disturbances in emotional, behavioral, cognitive and 
interpersonal functioning (Linehan, 1993; Gunderson, 2001). The symptoms of BPD 
include (1) frantic efforts to avoid abandonment, (2) a pattern of unstable and intense 
interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating extremes of idealization and 
devaluation, (3) markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self, (4) 
chronic feelings of emptiness, (5) transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe 
dissociative symptoms, (6) recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, threats, or deliberate 
self-harm, (7) impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging, (8) 
affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood, and (9) inappropriate, intense 
anger or difficulty controlling anger (APA, 2001). BPD is associated with high rates of 
psychiatric comorbidity, poor physical health and diminished academic and professional 
attainment (Zanarini, Frankenburg, Dubo, Sickel, Trika et al., 1998). Further, despite 
extensive utilization of outpatient mental health services and the increasing accessibility 
of empirically supported interventions for BPD (Bender, Dolan, Skodol, Sanislow, Dyck 
et al., 2001; Linehan, Comtois, Murray, Brown, Gallop et al., 2006; Bateman & Fonagy, 
1999, 2001), these individuals frequently demonstrate poor response to treatment and are 
more likely to utilize costly emergency and inpatient psychiatric services (Paris, 2005; 
Ames-Frankel, Devlin, Walsh, Strasser, Sadik, Oldham et al., 1992; Zanarini, 
Frankenburg, Khera & Bleichmar, 2001). The rate of BPD is estimated to be 50% in 




1991), and as high as 5.9% in the general population (Grant, Chou, Goldstein, Huang, 
Boji, Stinson et al., 2008). Given the prevalence, degree of functional impairment and 
substantial costs associated with BPD, the disorder poses a considerable clinical and 
public health challenge.  
Although there is considerable heterogeneity in the clinical presentation of BPD, 
it is widely considered to be a disorder of emotional dysfunction (Paris, 2005; Skodol, 
Gunderson, Pfohl, Widiger, Livesley et al., 2002; Linehan, 1993). Emotional dysfunction 
encompasses the tendency to have higher negative affectivity at baseline (Trull, Stepp & 
Durrett, 2003; Depue & Lenzenweger, 2001), which is compounded by greater 
sensitivity, intensity and duration of emotional responses to environmental and internal 
stimuli (Linehan, 1993; Skodol et al., 2002; Conklin & Westen, 2006). BPD symptom 
severity is positively correlated with negative affect intensity and reactivity (Yen, 
Zlotnick & Costello, 2002) and individuals with BPD often report greater state negative 
affect and trait neuroticism relative to healthy controls (Trull et al., 2003; Ebner-Priemer, 
Kuo, Kleindienst, Welch, Reisch et al., 2007).  When assessed periodically over two 
weeks, individuals with BPD demonstrated greater variability in mood over the course of 
the day and greater instability of mood across days, compared to depressed and healthy 
controls (Cowdry, Gardner, O’Leary, Leibenluft & Rubinow, 1991). Koenigsberg and 
colleagues (2002) found that individuals with BPD reported greater vacillation between 
anger and anxiety compared to individuals with other personality disorders, and 
comparable to the variability observed in individuals with bipolar II disorder 
(Koenigsberg et al., 2002). In sum, findings consistently support a constellation of 




understanding affective processes independent of, and in relation to other symptoms of 
this disorder.  
Beyond the emotional vulnerabilities associated with BPD, this disorder is 
characterized by striking rates of engagement in distress-induced risk behavior. For 
example, individuals with BPD demonstrate elevated rates of deliberate self-harm and 
suicide attempts, which are believed to occur in 70-75% of those with BPD, as well as 
high rates of substance abuse (64%), binge eating and/or purging (26%), impulsive sexual 
behavior (46%), excessive spending, and verbal outbursts, (APA, 2001; Gunderson, 
2001; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen & Silk, 2003; Zanarini et al.,1998; Trull, Sher, 
Minks-Brown, Durbin & Burr, 2000), with the majority of individuals with BPD 
engaging in multiple forms of self-destructive behavior (Zanarini et al., 2003). These 
self-damaging behaviors may be conceptualized as risk behaviors, to the extent that they 
are associated with the possibility of loss (e.g., serious physical harm or interpersonal 
loss), as well as the opportunity for reward (e.g., emotion regulatory or social functions; 
Leigh, 1999; Linehan, 1993; Nock & Prinstein, 2004).  
 
1.2 Risk Behavior in BPD: Clinical Findings 
 Engagement in risk behavior is a defining characteristic of BPD, with high rates 
of involvement observed across a range of self-destructive behaviors (Zanarini et al., 
2003). These behaviors are considered particularly dangerous, persistent and difficult to 
treat (Links, Helesgrave & van Reekum, 1999; Linehan, 1993; Lacey & Evans, 1986), 
highlighting the need to understand the basic processes involved in risk behavior. Extant 




associated with engagement in risk behavior, relying exclusively on retrospective self-
reports of emotional antecedents, consequences and reasons for risk behavior. For 
example, in two studies of deliberate self-harm in BPD, all participants reported 
dysphoric affect prior to engagement in deliberate self-harm, including anger, anxiety, 
sadness, tension, emptiness and loneliness (Chapman & Dixon-Gordon, 2007; 
Kleindienst, Bohus, Ludascher, Limberger, Kuenkele et al., 2008). In another study 
comparing reasons for deliberate self-harm and suicide attempts among outpatients with 
BPD, 96% of participants endorsed emotion relief as a reason for deliberate self-harm 
and 86% cited emotion relief as a reason for a suicide attempt (Brown, Comtois & 
Linehan, 2002).  Further, individuals with comorbid BPD and substance use disorders 
were found to be more likely than substance users without BPD to use alcohol in 
response to negative emotional states (Kruedelbach, McCormick, Schulz & Grueneich, 
1993). Taken together, research shows a significant association between negative affect 
and engagement in risk behavior among individuals with BPD.  
 However, the literature on risk behavior is limited in scope and in the modes of 
assessments used. Self-report measures have inherent limitations due to biases in recall 
and responding (i.e., the participant may not have a clear memory of the circumstances 
under which risk behavior occurred, or may be reluctant to disclose behaviors perceived 
as negative). In addition, only a fraction of potentially relevant factors can be assessed 
using retrospective self-report, leaving many unanswered questions about biobehavioral 
and contextual correlates of risk behavior. Finally, although the clinical literature 
suggests that risk behavior in BPD is characterized by its frequency, severity and breadth 




behavior and risk-related processes differ among individuals with and without BPD; this 
information may prove useful in understanding the intractability these behaviors in BPD. 
Thus, despite what is known about risk behavior in BPD, many questions remain 
unanswered, highlighting the need for broader research questions and novel modes of 
assessment. 
1.3 Risk Behavior in BPD: Experimental Findings 
 One way to improve our understanding of risk behavior in BPD is to study it a 
controlled laboratory setting. For obvious ethical reasons, self-damaging behavior cannot 
be evoked in the lab, however, risk behavior can be studied using standardized behavioral 
analogues. Performance-based assessment is objective, limiting threats to internal 
validity, and it permits experimental control and manipulation of contextual and 
intrapersonal factors thought to influence risk behavior (Matusiewicz, Reynolds & 
Lejuez, in press; Lejuez, Read, Kahler, Richards, Ramsey et al., 2002). In general, 
behavioral risk tasks require the participant to evaluate competing options to balance 
immediate rewards with probabilistic, delayed losses. For example, the Balloon Analogue 
Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002) is a computerized task that assesses the 
participant’s tendency to pursue immediate certain rewards in the face of increasing 
probability of risk. During the task, the participant pumps up a simulated balloon by 
clicking a button on the screen. With each pump, the balloon inflates and the participant 
adds $0.05 to her temporary winnings. At any point, the participant can choose to deposit 
the earnings into the bank where they can no longer be lost, at which point the trial ends 
and a new trial begins. However, if the balloon pops before the participant banks the 




balancing the possibility of gain against the potential for loss in each trail. Given the 
tendency of individuals with BPD to persist in certain behaviors despite the potential for 
extremely negative consequences, it has been hypothesized that participants with BPD 
should exhibit greater risk behavior on the BART relative to controls. However, findings 
have not supported this hypothesis. For example, Coffey and colleagues (2009) found 
that found that individuals with BPD do not differ from healthy controls in terms of risk 
behavior on BART (Coffey, 2009), findings which have been corroborated in 
unpublished studies conducted by our group. Notably, these unexpected results have been 
corroborated by findings from a related task of risky decision-making, the Iowa 
Gambling Task (McCloskey et al., 2009).  
 In sum, behavioral measures of risk and risky decision-making have failed to 
show elevated risk behavior among individuals with and without BPD, denoting a 
discrepancy between clinical reports and experimental results. One possible explanation 
is the inconsistency between clinical observations and existing experimental risk 
paradigms, particularly with regard to the role of negative affect in precipitating risk 
behavior among those with BPD (Paris, 2005). Current experimental risk paradigms have 
failed to account for the effect of distress on risk behavior. Accordingly, the lack of 
findings from laboratory-based studies of risk behavior is not altogether surprising. In 
light of results that implicate negative affect as an antecedent of risk behavior, it is 
possible that distress functions as a moderator of the relationship between BPD and risk 
behavior. That is, individuals with BPD might not be expected to differ from healthy 
controls during periods of neutral or euthymic mood, but group differences in risk 




behavior). However, the question of affect as a moderator of the relationship between 
BPD and risk behavior has yet to be examined directly in a laboratory setting.  
 Characterizing the effect of distress on risk behavior constitutes an important first 
step toward identifying the factors that explain the strong association between BPD and 
distress-induced risk behavior. Although it is clear that distress and risk behaviors tend to 
co-occur, relatively little is known about the processes through which distress influences 
engagement in risk behavior, and how these processes may differ among individuals with 
and without BPD.  
 
1.4 Neurocognitive Processes Underlying Risk Behavior 
A recently proposed theory of risk behavior emphasizes the contribution of 
neurocognitive factors to engagement in risk behavior (Cohen, 2005). Briefly, the 
neurocognitive model attempts to explain how problems with the executive control 
system may lead to risk behavior (Cohen, 2005; Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2004). This model suggests that risk behavior emerges as 
the product of competition between the executive control system and the affective system 
(Cohen, 2005; Casey et al., 2008). The executive control system is responsible for 
effortful, logical information processing and inhibition. In addition, the system has a 
unique capacity for forethought, anticipation of consequences, and delay of gratification 
in the service of long-term goals (Atance & O’Neill, 2001). The executive control system 
is opposed by the affective system, which encompasses limbic structures (amygdala, 
ventral striatum, insula; Clark, Boutros & Mendez, 2005; Cohen, 2005), as well as 




(McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004; Cohen, 2005). In contrast to the 
executive control system, the affective system is automatic, reward-driven, and present-
focused (Weber et al., 2004; Cohen et al, 2005).  
Within the neurocognitive framework, the executive control system is usually 
dominant, inhibiting the impulses of the affective system to produce mostly rational, self-
controlled behavior. However, when the inhibitory functions of the executive control 
system are overridden by the affective system, behavior is directed toward immediate 
gratification, whether in the form of reward or escape/avoidance (Weber et al., 2004). 
The affective system is associative and present-focused, so behavior is determined by the 
previous success of the response in achieving a given objective, whereas potential future 
consequences are not salient. Thus, risk behavior is not inherently maladaptive or 
dysfunctional, but may be against the individual’s longer-term interests.  
A number of factors may serve attenuate the executive control system, leaving it 
more vulnerable to be overridden by the affective system (e.g., including sleep 
deprivation and hunger; Durmer & Dinges, 2005; Gailliot, Baumeister, DeWall, Maner, 
Plant et al., 2007).  Two factors in particular are of relevance to BPD, providing two 
plausible mechanisms to explain the relationship between BPD and distress-induced risk 
behavior. One factor responsible for a weak executive control system is the existence of 
stable, trait-like deficits (observable through stable deficits in executive functioning). 
These deficits are non-affective in nature (i.e., observable independent of contextual 
factors such as negative affect) and are thought to reflect neuromodulatory failure caused 
by chronic underfunctioning of the serotonergic system (Depue, 1995; Lenzenweger, 




control system reduces its ability to inhibit inappropriate impulses from the affective 
system, producing a propensity to engage in maladaptive risk behavior (Depue, 1995).  
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the executive control system may be 
weakened by temporary, distress-related disruptions in functioning (i.e., affective 
deficits; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2006; Tice, Bratslavsky & Baumeister, 2001).  Within 
this model, deficits in executive control and, consequently, the tendency to behave in 
risky ways, are transient and linked with the distress response. Specifically, it has been 
suggested that limbic over-activation in response to distress and distress-cues produces a 
hyperdopaminergic response that takes the executive control system “off-line” leaving 
behavior to be controlled the impulsive affective system (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 
1998; Cohen, 2005). Thus, the acute disruptive effects of distress on executive control 
may mediate relationship between distress and risk behavior.  
In light of these distinct neurocognitive pathways to risk behavior, it is unclear 
which model has the most relevance to understanding the association between BPD and 
distress-induced risk behavior. While current research provides some support for the 
presence of non-affective deficits in executive control in BPD (see Fertuck et al., 2006, 
the proposed relationship between these deficits and risk behavior has not been tested 
experimentally. On the other hand, the social cognitive literature provides evidence for 
the relationship between affective deficits in executive control and risk behavior (e.g., 
Leith & Baumeister, Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) but it has 
not yet been applied to BPD. However, given the prominence of emotional intensity and 
reactivity in BPD, and the strong relationship between distress and risk taking in this 




non-affective and affective deficits in executive functioning, and the extent to which 
these factors relate to risk behavior. 
1.4.1. Non-Affective Executive Functioning in BPD 
Findings suggest that BPD is associated with a specific deficit in executive 
functioning: the tendency to make perseverative errors. This type of error reflects 
difficulty transferring attention from one rule to the next and difficulties adapting 
behavior to align with new contingencies (Konishi, et al., 1998). Across multiple studies, 
findings support this as critical deficit among individuals with BPD.  For example, 
Lenzenweger and colleagues (2004) compared patients with BPD to healthy controls on a 
battery of tests of executive function. Participants with BPD did not differ from controls 
on less demanding attention-based tasks, but evidenced a significantly greater percentage 
of perseverative errors (13% vs. 10%) relative to the control group. Though a seemingly 
minor difference, this discrepancy in performance corresponds to a medium effect size (d 
= .48; Cohen, 1988). Similarly, O’Leary and colleagues (1991) compared neurocognitive 
performance in a sample of BPD outpatients and healthy controls. While results did not 
reach statistical significance, perhaps due to small sample size (n = 16 in each group), 
participants with BPD made considerably more perseverative errors than controls  (d = 
.55). Likewise, Burgess and colleagues (1991) examined neurocognitive deficits in 
outpatients with BPD and those with chronic depression. Participants with BPD made 
more perseverative errors (d = .57) than depressed controls. Moreover, Lenzenweger and 
colleagues (2004) reported that set shifting errors were not correlated with trait-level 
positive or negative emotionality, nor were they correlated with state anxiety or current 




deficits among participants with BPD. Taken together, findings suggest that, relative to 
controls, individuals with BPD exhibit a specific, non-affective deficit in executive 
functioning, characterized by persistence in a response set despite negative feedback 
(Barcelo & Knight, 2002). 
Although findings support the presence of non-affective deficits in executive 
functioning in BPD, there is little research to support the relationship of these deficits to 
risk behavior. Research has not yet examined the relationship of executive cognitive 
deficits to BPD symptom clusters or specific behavioral patterns. Although there is 
general theoretical and empirical support for the association of executive dysfunction and 
risk behavior (e.g., Brand et al., 2007), it is unclear whether a causal relationship exists 
between non-affective neurocognitive deficits observed in BPD and risk behavior, or 
whether these are two distinct phenomena common to BPD. Clearly, continued research 
is necessary to provide support for the relationship among non-affective deficits and risk 
behavior in BPD, and to understand the extent to which non-affective deficits constitute a 
unique vulnerability to risk behavior among those with BPD relative to controls. 
1.4.2 Affective Executive Functioning in BPD 
In addition, it has been suggested that the executive control system may be 
weakened by temporary, distress-related disruptions in functioning (i.e., affective 
deficits; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2006; Tice, Bratslavsky & Baumeister, 2001). Within the 
framework of the affective neurocognitive model, distress disrupts neurocognitive 
functioning, which in turn leads to risky behavior, for example by impairing inhibitory 
control over risky affective urges, or impeding rational evaluation (Figner et al., 2009; 




occur as part of a normal, and perhaps even adaptive response to distress. That is, the 
switch from slower, resource intensive processing of the PFC to automatic to rapid 
subcortical functioning may have survival value in threatening situations, however, the 
stress-reactivity of the executive control system may impede effortful attempts at 
behavioral self-control and emotion regulation in humans (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 
1998; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross & Gabrieli, 2002). Although this process is not specific to 
BPD, recent findings suggest that individuals with BPD may be especially vulnerable to 
the effects of negative affect on executive cognitive processes due to heightened limbic 
reactivity (Silbersweig, Clarkin, Goldstein, Kernberg, Tuescher et al., 2007). Thus, the 
affective neurocognitive model provides an additional explanation for the prominent 
relationship between BPD and distress-induced risk behavior. 
 Affective deficits in executive function among individuals with BPD have not 
been examined directly using experimental affect manipulation. Rather, the research on 
affective neurocognitive deficits has tended to use emotionally evocative stimuli during 
cognitive tasks. Furthermore, the research on affective neurocognition has not yet 
examined the effect of distress on perserverative errors, as an index of cognitive control. 
However, several studies have found that individuals with BPD exhibit disruptions in 
cognitive functioning in response to relatively minor distress-related cues. For instance, 
findings suggest that BPD is associated with poorer cognitive inhibition of emotionally 
evocative words (Arntz et al., 2000; Korfine & Hooley, 2002), although they do not differ 
from controls in their ability to inhibit valence-neutral material (Fertuck et al., 2005). In 
addition, a recent fMRI study examined motor inhibition in response to distress and 




found that the BPD group had poorer behavioral inhibition in response to distress cues, 
which corresponded to limbic hyper-reactivity and decreased activity in the prefrontal 
cortex. Taken together, findings suggest two cognitive processes that are disrupted by 
exposure to distress-related cues (if not distress, per se) among individuals with BPD. 
The disruption of executive function by affect appears to be particularly exaggerated 
among those with BPD, which may partially explain why these individuals are likely to 
engage in risk behavior when distressed.   
 Findings that executive functioning is disrupted by negative affect are generally 
consistent with the neurocognitive model of risk behavior. However, very limited has 
been conducted to establish the relationship between affective executive dysfunction and 
risk behavior. Preliminary findings come from Korfine and Hooley’s (2002) study of 
directed forgetting with BPD and non-BPD participants, in which the extent of deficits in 
affective cognitive inhibition was positively associated with overall BPD symptom 
severity, affective instability and impulsivity symptoms (i.e., engagement in multiple 
forms of risk behavior; rs = .35-.39). These findings highlight an ongoing need to clarify 
whether affective neurocognitive deficits and risk behavior are simply correlated, or 
whether a causal link exists between them.  
1.5. Summary and Significance 
Borderline personality disorder is a severe mental illness characterized by 
characterized by emotional dysfunction and high rates of engagement in self-destructive 
behavior (e.g., self-harm, substance use, binge eating and purging). These behaviors may 
be conceptualized as risk behaviors to the extent that they are associated with the 




consequences (e.g., serious physical harm, interpersonal conflict). The clinical literature 
indicates a strong association between risk-taking and BPD. However, laboratory studies 
rarely find differences in risk taking comparing those with BPD and healthy controls, 
leaving little understanding of the key processes that underlie this relationship.  
One limitation of many laboratory studies is that most current experimental risk 
paradigms examine risk behavior independent of affect. Thus, the role of negative affect 
in precipitating risk behavior (i.e., distress-induced risk behavior) has not been studied, 
highlighting a fundamental inconsistency between clinical observations of those with 
BPD, and experimental methods. Characterizing the effect of distress on risk behavior is 
a necessary first step toward identifying the basic mechanisms that underlie the striking 
relationship between BPD and distress-induced risk behavior.  
A related question is what basic processes may underlie this relationship. One 
process thought to influence engagement in risk behavior is disruption in neurocognitive 
functioning. Within a neurocognitive framework, risk behavior occurs as a product of 
competition between the rational cognitive control system and the impulsive, reward-
focused affective system. The cognitive control system usually determines behavior by 
inhibiting the impulses of the affective system, however, when the executive control 
system is weak, the affective system exerts greater influence, resulting in behavior that is 
present-moment focused and therefore often risky. Recent findings suggest two ways in 
which the cognitive control system may be compromised in BPD, which may explain the 
distinct pattern of distress-induced risk behavior in this group. That is, deficits in 
cognitive control may be non-affective (i.e., stable, traitlike), or they may be affective 




non-affective and affective neurocognitive deficits in BPD, the relationship of these 
cognitive vulnerabilities to engagement in distress-induced risk behavior has not yet been 
examined empirically.  
 
1.6 Current Study 
The primary aim of the current study is to examine the relationship between 
diagnostic group (BPD, non-BPD) and risk behavior as a function of induced affect 
(neutral, distress). In addition, the current study examines whether group differences in 
risk behavior are mediated by affective or non-affective executive functioning. Finally, in 
the BPD group, we examine whether within-subject change in risk behavior (as a 
function of affect) is mediated by corresponding changes in executive functioning.  To 
address these questions, participants will complete a computerized behavioral measure of 
risk behavior and a computerized measure of executive function, which will be 
completed over the course of three experimental sessions. Affect will be manipulated 
using neutral and distress imagery scripts (Sinha et al., 1999, 2000). To our knowledge, 
this will be the first experimental study to examine the relationships among distress-
induced changes in risk behavior and executive functioning among participants with 









Primary Aim. To examine group (BPD, non-BPD) differences in risk behavior under 
conditions of induced affect (neutral, distress). 
 Hypothesis The relationship between diagnostic group and engagement 
in risk behavior on a laboratory risk task will vary as a 
function of affect, such that: 
a) the BPD group will exhibit a significant increase in risk 
behavior in the distress condition; and  
b) the two groups will not differ in the neutral condition 
but the BPD group will exhibit greater risk behavior 
than the non-BPD group in the distress condition. 
Secondary 
Aim 
To examine group (BPD, non-BPD) differences in executive functioning 
under conditions of induced affect (neutral, distress).  
 Hypothesis The relationship between diagnostic group and executive 
functioning will vary as a function of affect, such that: 
a) the BPD group will exhibit poorer executive 
functioning at baseline, relative to the non-BPD group 
b)  the BPD group will evidence a decrease in executive 
functioning in the distress condition compared to the 
neutral; the non-BPD group will not show this effect.   
Exploratory 
Aim 
To examine executive functioning (Aim #2) a mediator of the 






Chapter 2: Research Design and Methods 
2.1 Overall Design  
 A 2 x 2 mixed factorial design was used to compare risk behavior (BART score). 
Condition (2; neutral script, distress script) was the within-subject factor and diagnosis 
(BPD, non-BPD) was the between-subjects factor. Each participant completed the BART 
(Lejuez et al., 2002) twice, once in the neutral condition and once in the distress 
condition. Each participant completed the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Grant & 
Berg, 1948; Heaton et al., 1993) three times (in an effort to control for practice effects; 
Collie et al., 2003): once as a baseline, once in the neutral condition and once in the 
distress condition. Condition order was randomly assigned for each participant, and the 
order of the tasks was counterbalanced across participants.  
 
2.2. Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area using 
flyers and postings on internet message boards (e.g., Craigslist). Recruitment materials 
announced a study of emotion and cognition seeking women between 18-35 who (1) had 
difficult or painful relationships; (2) felt their emotions are very intense or out of control 
and (3) did things while upset that they regret later. Interested individuals were advised to 
contact the study by phone or e-mail to complete a phone screening to determine 
eligibility.  
During the phone screening, participants were asked demographic and psychiatric 
questions to determine their eligibility for the study. Participants were enrolled if they 




endorsed: (1) current depressive episode (past month); (2) current substance dependence 
(past six months); (3) a lifetime history of mania; and (4) a lifetime history of psychotic 
symptoms. Individuals who were disqualified for any reason were offered referral 
information for free or low-cost mental health services.  
 Recruitment occurred in two stages. In the first stage (6/10 through 8/10), no 
questions related to BPD were asked during the phone screening. In the second stage 
(9/10 through 12/10), BPD screening questions were added to increase the proportion of 
participants with a probable BPD diagnosis. The BPD screening consisted of questions 
adapted from the BPD diagnostic interview to assess four symptom domains: anger, 
affective instability, difficult/painful relationships and impulsive behavior. In the second 
phase of recruitment, participants who endorsed none of those symptoms were enrolled, 
as were participants who endorsed three or more symptoms.  
Figure 1 provides recruitment and retention information for participants enrolled 
in the study. Diagnostic groups were formed on the basis of a structured clinical 
interview for BPD. Participants were assigned to the non-BPD group (n = 19) if they 
endorsed three or fewer symptoms of BPD, and to the BPD group (n = 11) if they 
endorsed five or more symptoms. Consistent with previous research, participants who 
endorsed four symptoms of BPD (n = 2) were excluded from planned analyses (Gratz, 





2.3 Assessment Procedures 
The study consisted of three sessions, all held at the Center for Addictions, Personality 
and Emotion Research at the University of Maryland College Park. All procedures were 
approved by the University of Maryland’s Institutional Review Board. 
 
2.3.1 Session 1  (Baseline) 
Once consent was provided, participants began the baseline assessment in a 
private room. Session 1 began with the administration of two semi-structured clinical 
interviews to diagnose Axis I psychopathology and BPD. Following completion of the 
diagnostic assessment, participants completed an imagery training. The first part of the 
imagery training consisted of a 10-minute progressive muscle relaxation exercise, to help 
the participant fully engage in the subsequent imagery training.  Next, the imagery 
training had participants practice imagining common, emotion-neutral scenes and events 
(e.g., reading a magazine, doing sit-ups in gym class), “as if it were happening right 
now.”  After each practice script, participants were asked to describe the imagined scene 
and were given tips to enhance the vividness of the imagined scenes. Participants were 
encouraged to notice physiological changes that accompanied the imagery.  This type of 
training has been shown to reduce variability in baseline imagery ability, and prolong the 
effects of mood manipulations (Miller et al., 1987; Zoellner et al., 2003; Sinclair et al., 
1994).   
Following completion of the imagery training, participants were asked to recount 




completed the WCST (the WCST was administered three times in total to control for 
practice effects over multiple administrations; the first administration was the baseline, 
and the second and third administrations were compared to evaluate change as a function 
of affect). Following the WCST, participants were compensated $20 and scheduled for 
their next session.  
 
2.3.2 Sessions 2 & 3  
For the next two sessions, condition order was randomly assigned (neutral first or 
distress first). To encourage participants’ effort on the tasks, participants were informed 
that they would be compensated between $10 and $20, based on their performance on the 
WCST and BART, however, all participants were compensated $20 for each 45-minute 
session.  
With the exception of the script content, the sessions followed identical 
procedures. Before beginning, participants were provided with instructions for both tasks 
and reminded to use their vivid imagery techniques. Participants completed a rating of 
mood (PANAS 1), listened to the imagery script and completed another rating of mood 
(PANAS 2). Then, participants completed the WCST and BART; the order of the tasks 
was randomly assigned across participants. Participants were then compensated $20 for 
each session and scheduled for their next session (Session 2) or debriefed about the 





2.4 Affect Induction 
2.4.1 Distress Imagery Script 
 Prior to the distress condition, a personalized distress imagery script was 
developed for each participant, using the information provided by participants during the 
script development interview in Session 1 (Sinha et al., unpublished manual). During the 
interview, participants were asked to think of a situation that made them “sad mad or 
upset” and which “in the moment [they] felt like they could not do anything to change” 
(Sinha et al., unpublished manual). Participants rated the level of distress they 
experienced on a 1-10 scale, and only situations that were scored a 7 or higher were used. 
Example situations included break-ups, arguments, hearing bad news, being in a car 
accident, and taking an important exam. Scripts were written to include emotions, 
thoughts, urges and interoceptive cues that participants reported during the interview.  
The script was then audio-recorded and uploaded to the study computer. Scripts were 
approximately 3 minutes in length, with a 15 second period to “keep imagining.” Prior to 
hearing each script, participants were instructed to “close [their] eyes and imagine the 
situation as if it were happening right now.” Appendix I contains an example distress 
script.  
 2.4.2 Neutral Imagery Script 
 A standard neutral imagery script was used for all participants. The script 
described a peaceful day at the beach, and was approximately 3 minutes in length, 
followed by a 15 second imagery period afterward. The neutral imagery script was 
administered in the manner described above. Appendix II contains the standard neutral 







2.5.1 Clinical Interview and Questionnaires 
1. Demographic and Treatment History Questionnaire. Participants provided basic 
demographic information including age, gender, education level, and family income. 
In addition, participants provided information about past and current psychological 
and psychiatric treatment.  
2. Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-NP, non-patient version, First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 2002). Diagnostic inclusions/exclusions and lifetime 
prevalence of Axis I diagnoses were determined using the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-NP, non-patient version, First, Spitzer, Gibbon & 
Domain Measure 
Axis I Psychopathology Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (First et al., 2002) 
BPD 
Diagnostic Interview for DSM-IV Personality Disorders: BPD 
Module (Zanarini et al., 1996) 
Personal Information Demographics and Treatment History 
Affect 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark & 
Tellegen, 1988) 
Executive Functioning Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Grant & Berg, 1948) 




Williams, 2002). The SCID-IV-NP has demonstrated reliability in non-clinical 
samples (First et al., 2002). Interviews were conducted by senior research staff, 
trained and supervised in the administration of this interview.  
3. Diagnostic Interview for Personality Disorders- DSM-IV (DIPD-IV, Zanarini, et al., 
1996). The DIPD-IV is an empirically supported semi-structured interview used to 
diagnose Axis II personality disorders. The BPD module of the DIPD-IV consists of 
53 individual questions that correspond to the nine DSM-IV symptoms of BPD. The 
DIPD-IV has demonstrated good inter-rater and test-retest reliability (Zanarini et al., 
2000). Diagnoses were confirmed through discussion and consensus.   
4. Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark Tellegen, 1988). This 20-
item measure will be used as a manipulation check, to assess positive and negative 
mood at four timepoints throughout the experiment. The scale assesses both positive 
(PA) and negative (NA) affect. PA reflects the extent to which a person feels 
enthusiastic, alert, and active while NA reflects a person’s subjective distress and 
encompasses anger, contempt, disgust, and guilt. The PANAS commonly is used to 
detect changes in emotional reactions to stimuli in the manner proposed here (e.g., 
Sharpe & Gilbert, 1998). The PANAS has been found to have good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = ..86-.90 for PA, .84-.87 for NA; Crawford & Henry, 
2004) and good construct, convergent and discriminant validity in clinical and non-
clinical samples (Watson et al., 1988).  The negative affect score will be calculated by 
taking the average of ratings for the 10 negative affect items. Likewise, the positive 




affect items. Both scales will have a range from 1 to 5, with higher scores reflecting 
greater intensity of negative or positive affect.  
 
2.5.2. Behavioral Measures 
1. Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez, Read, Kahler, Richards, Ramsey et al., 
2002). The BART is a computerized task that assesses risk-taking behavior, defined 
as behaviors that involve the potential for reward as well as the risk of harm (Leigh, 
1999). In the task, the participant is presented with a small balloon and asked to pump 
the balloon by clicking a button on the screen. With each click, the balloon inflates .3 
cm and $0.05 are added to the participant’s temporary winnings. At any point, the 
participant has the option to press a button labeled “Collect $$$” which deposits the 
amount in temporary winnings to the bank (i.e., it can no longer be lost) and ends the 
trial, at which point new trial begins. However, each balloon is programmed to pop 
somewhere between 1 and 128 pumps, with an average breakpoint of 64 pumps. If the 
participant fails to press “Collect $$$” before the balloon pops, all earnings for that 
balloon are lost and the next balloon is presented. Risk behavior  is operationalized as 
the average number of pumps on unpopped balloons (Lejuez et al., 2002; 
Bornovalova, Lejuez, Daughters, Rosenthal & Lynch, 2005). This index of risk 
behavior has high test-retest stability ( M across three trials, r = .8; Lejuez, Aklin, 
Jones, Richards, Strong et al., 2003), which makes it appropriate for repeated-
measures designs. The BART will be administered twice, once in the neutral 
condition, and once in the distress condition.  Distress-induced change in risk 




BART score in the distress condition, such that higher scores suggest greater risk 
taking in the distress condition.  
2. Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948; Heaton et al., 1993; 
Mueller, 2006). WCST is a measure of executive function during which the 
participant must infer a sorting rule and adapt to periodic changes in the rule (i.e., set 
shifting). In the task, the participant is shown four piles of cards, each of which has 
symbols printed on it. Each pile of cards differs in terms of shape, color and number 
(e.g., two green squares, three yellow stars, etc.). The participant is presented with 
additional cards that must be sorted into the existing piles based on a rule, which 
changes periodically without warning. The participant receives feedback following 
each sort and must adapt her responses to fit the new rule. The primary dependent 
variable from the WCST is the percentage of perseverative errors, which is indexed as 
the total number of perseverative errors divided by total number of errors. This index 
has been found to have marginal to good test-retest stability (r =  .56 to.83; Ingram et 
al., 1999; Strauss et al., 2006). Although we considered applying statistical 
corrections to the data to control for practice effects (e.g., regression-based 
standardized Z-scores, as suggested by Hermann and colleagues [2006]), we 
ultimately decided to follow an approach to maxinimze the interpretability of our 
data. Collie and colleagues (2003) reported that practice effects on WCST are marked 
from Trial 1 to Trial 2, but are minimal in subsequent trials when tasks are re-
administered at brief intervals. Therefore, the WCST was administered three times. 
The first administration (Session 1) was used as a baseline measure. The second and 




was randomly assigned). Change in executive functioning as a function of affect was 
calculated by subtracting performance in the neutral condition from performance in 
the distress condition, such that higher scores denotes a higher error rate (hence 
poorer executive functioning) in the distress condition.  
 
2.6 Statistical Analyses 
All analyses were conducted using the PASW Statistics Package (v. 18.0). First, 
the distributional properties of all noncategorical variables were assessed to determine 
whether they met the statistical assumptions for the analyses. Violations of normality 
were assessed using skewness and kurtosis, and addressed using square root 
transformations.  Participants with missing data for BART or any session of the WCST 
were excluded from the primary analyses (see Figure 1).  
Before addressing the primary, secondary and exploratory aims, a number of steps 
were taken. A manipulation check was conducted to determine whether the two imagery 
scripts produced significant changes in positive and negative affect from pre-script to 
post-script. To do this, a 2x2x2 mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted for negative 
affect. The within-subjects factors were condition (2; distress, neutral) and time (2; pre-
script, post-script) and the between-subjects factor was diagnosis (BPD, non-BPD). Pre- 
and post-script negative affect ratings were used for each condition. This analysis was 
repeated for positive affect. Next, we examined potential covariates, including 
demographic and clinical variables, as well as several variables related to study 
procedures (e.g., condition order, pre-script NA across sessions 2 and 3). No covariates 




 To address the primary study aim that affect will moderate the effect of diagnosis 
on risk behavior, we conducted a 2x2 mixed factorial ANOVA for with risk behavior 
(BART score) as the dependent variable, condition (2; distress, neutral) as the within-
subject variable and diagnosis (2; BPD, non-BPD) as the between-subjects variable. The 
interaction of condition by diagnosis was probed using separate oneway repeated 
measure ANOVAs for each group. The effect of diagnosis on risk behavior in the neutral 
condition was probed using a univariate ANOVA with group as the between-subjects 
independent variable. This analysis was repeated for the distress condition. We had a 
priori hypotheses that 1) BPD group would exhibit greater risk behavior in the distress 
condition than in the neutral condition and 2) the BPD group would exhibit greater risk 
behavior than the non-BPD group in the distress condition, so these effects were tested at 
p < .05 (one-tailed). All other planned analyses were conducted using p < .05 (two-
tailed).  
Our first exploratory hypothesis aimed to test whether within-subject changes in 
executive functioning1 mediated within-subject changes in risk behavior2, in the BPD 
group.  We followed guidelines by Judd, Kinney and McClelland (2001) for testing a 
within-subject (repeated measure) mediator of a within-subject (repeated measure) 
dependent variable. Specifically, this process involves identifying a main effect of 
condition on the mediator (WCST), calculating a change score for the mediator (WCST 
distress – WCST neutral) and the dependent variable (BART distress – BART neutral), 
                                                
1 Within-subject changes in executive functioning were calculated by subtracting 
executive functioning in the neutral condition from executive functioning in the distress 
condition.  
2 2 Within-subject changes in risk behavior were calculated by subtracting risk behavior in 




then regressing the dependent variable change score on the mediator change score. A 
mediated effect is present if the mediator change score significantly predicts the 
dependent variable change score (Judd et al., 2001).  
The second exploratory hypothesis was that the relationship between diagnosis 
and risk behavior in the distress condition would be mediated by group differences in 
baseline executive functioning and/or distressed executive functioning. To test this, we 
followed recommendations to formally test mediation suggested by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) and Judd and Kenny (1981). For this hypothesis, a series of hierarchical 
regression analysis was conducted; our independent variable was diagnosis, the 
dependent variable was risk behavior in the distress condition. The proposed mediators 
were baseline executive functioning  and distressed executive functioning. The test for 
mediation required the following steps: 1) the independent variable must significantly 
predict dependent variable; 2) diagnosis must significantly predict the mediator; 3) the 
mediator must significantly predict the dependent variable and 4) when both the 
independent variable and the mediator are included in the same model to predict the 
dependent variable, the mediator must remain significant, and the effect of the 
independent variable must be reduced to non-significance. A fifth step was added in line 
with the recommendations of Mackinnon and colleagues (2002) who suggest providing a 
direct estimate of the effect size of the mediated effect by constructing confidence limits 
for the mediated effect using standard errors. If the confidence intervals include 0 then 





Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Participants 
 A total of 44 completed the full three-session protocol. Analyses for the current 
study are based on a total sample of 30 participants (n = 11 BPD). Figure 1 provides an 
overview of participant recruitment and retention. 
  A series of t-tests and chi-square analyses were conducted on demographic and 
clinical variables to identify differences between groups. Findings are presented in Table 
1. The two groups did not differ significantly in terms of any demographic characteristics 
(ps > .10) between the BPD and non-BPD group. Likewise, there were no significant 
differences in lifetime rates of substance use disorders or lifetime or current rates of 
anxiety disorders. There was a significant difference in lifetime rates of major depressive 
disorder in the BPD and non-BPD groups (χ2 = 4.04, p < .04) with a significantly higher 
rate observed in the BPD group. Lifetime rates of psychiatric treatment did not differ 
between the two groups (p = .88).  
3.3 Manipulation Check 
As a manipulation check for the affect inductions (i.e., distress and neutral 
scripts), negative affect (NA) and positive affect (PA) scores from the PANAS were 
examined for both conditions (Table 2). To characterize the effects of the scripts on affect 
2 by 2 by 2 mixed factorial ANOVAs (separately for NA and PA), with condition 
(neutral, distress) and time (pre-script, post-script) as the within-subjects factors and 
diagnosis (BPD, non-BPD) as the between-subjects factor. For NA, findings revealed a 




Analysis of simple effects revealed that this effect was driven by an increase in NA from 
pre- to post-script in the distress condition, with no such change in the neutral condition. 
Notably, there was a significant main effect of diagnosis on NA, F(1, 28) = 5.14, p = .03, 
η2  = .16 such that participants with BPD were higher in NA overall. However, the 3-way 
interaction of condition by time by diagnosis was not significant, F(1, 28) = 1.26, p = 
.27, partial η2 = .03, suggesting that participants with and without BPD experienced 
comparable increases in NA from pre-script to post-script in the distress condition.  
 This analysis was repeated with PA as the dependent variable. Results again 
indicated a significant condition by time interaction, F(1, 28) = 6.78, p < .02, η2  = .20). 
Follow-up analyses revealed that ratings of PA decreased from pre- to post-script in the 
distress condition, but did not change from pre- to post-script in the neutral condition. 
The three-way interaction of condition by time by diagnosis was not significant for PA.  
  Taken together, findings suggest that the distress manipulation increased 
subjective NA and decreased subjective PA, producing similar changes for both groups 
from pre- to post- script. The neutral imagery script was not associated with significant 
changes in PA or NA for either group, suggesting that it is appropriate to consider this a 
“neutral” mood manipulation.  
3.2 Examination of Potential Covariates 
Prior to conducting the primary data analyses, preliminary analyses were 
conducted to examine the effect of demographic (e.g., age, racial background) and 
clinical factors (e.g., lifetime rates of mood, anxiety and substance use disorders) on 
variables of interest, to identify potential covariates. Age, racial/ethnic background, and 




Similarly, history of psychiatric treatment and lifetime diagnoses of mood, anxiety and 
substance use disorders were not associated with performance on BART (neutral or 
distressed) or WCST variables of interest. Therefore, these variables were not included as 
covariates in subsequent analyses. 
In addition, we evaluated condition order (i.e., whether the participant received 
the neutral or distress condition first) as a potential covariate. Although order was 
randomly assigned, 64% of the total sample received the neutral condition first, compared 
to 34% who received the distress condition first. However, condition order was not 
significantly associated with the dependent variables (ps > .24), and was therefore not 
included in subsequent analyses.  
3.3 Primary Aim  
 The primary hypothesis was that affect would moderate the relationship between 
diagnosis and risk behavior, such that the BPD group would not differ from controls in 
the neutral condition, but would exhibit a significant increase in risk behavior in the 
distress condition. To test this hypothesis, a 2 by 2 mixed factorial ANOVA was 
conducted predicting BART score. Condition (2; neutral, distress) was the within-
subjects factor, diagnosis (2; BPD, non-BPD) was the between-subjects factor. Results 
revealed a significant interaction between condition and diagnosis, F(1, 28) = 13.14; p = 
.001, partial η2  = .32 (see Figure 2 and Table 3). Notably, there was not a main effect of 
diagnosis, although this effect approached significance, F(1, 28) = 3.32, p = .08, partial 
η2  = .11.  
To probe the interaction of condition and diagnosis on BART score, oneway 




BART score was the dependent variable and condition was within-subject factor. The 
BPD group showed a significant effect of condition on BART, F(1, 10) = 3.34, p = .03, 
one-tailed, partial η 2  = .30, which reflects a significant increase in risk behavior in the 
distress condition compared to the neutral condition. On the other hand, the non-BPD 
group showed a significant decrease in risk behavior in the distress condition compared 
to the neutral condition, F (1, 18) = 9.49, p = .006, partial η 2  = .35).  
To test the hypothesis that the groups would not differ in terms of risk behavior in 
the neutral condition, but would differ significantly in the distress condition, we 
conducted univariate ANOVAs comparing group differences in BART scores in the two 
conditions. The two groups did not differ in the neutral condition, F (1, 28) = .98, p = .33, 
however, they were significantly different in the distress condition, F (1, 28) = 6.68, p = 
.015. 
3.4. Secondary Aim 
To test our hypotheses related to group differences in executive functioning at 
baseline, and change in executive functioning as a function of affect, a 3x2 mixed 
factorial ANOVAs was conducted. The within-subjects factor was condition (baseline, 
neutral and distress) 3 and the between-subjects factor was diagnosis (BPD, non-BPD). 
Results revealed a significant main effect of diagnosis on executive functioning, F (2, 27) 
=  7.15, p = .012, partial η2 = .20. Unexpectedly, the BPD group exhibited significantly 
better executive functioning than the non-BPD group, across conditions. The effect of 
                                                
3 The WCST was measured on three occasions to control for practice effects, as 




condition on executive functioning was not significant, F (2, 27) = 1.18, p = .32, partial 
η2 = .04).  
3.5 Exploratory Analyses 
The exploratory aim of this study was to evaluate the relationship of executive 
functioning and risk behavior. Specifically, we examined 1) within-subject change in 
executive functioning in relation to within-subject change in risk behavior4; and 2) group 
differences in executive functioning (baseline, distress) in relation to group differences in 
risk behavior in the distress condition. The present analyses focus on percent 
perseverative errors, as an index of global executive functioning (Barcelo & Nyhus, 
2009). 
Our first exploratory hypothesis was that the extent to which participants 
experienced changes in executive functioning would predict to the extent to which they 
exhibited changes in risk behavior. To test this effect, we planned to follow procedures 
outlined by Judd, Kenny and McClelland (2001) to test a time-varying mediator in a 
within-subject design. This procedure requires that two conditions be met. First, there 
must be an effect of condition on executive functioning. Second, the difference in 
executive functioning across conditions must predict the difference in risk taking across 
conditions. However, as outlined above, we failed to find a significant effect of condition 
on either measure of executive functioning, and therefore did not meet the first 
requirement to demonstrate mediation. Accordingly, it was not necessary to test the 
second condition to demonstrate mediation.  
                                                
4 Given the limited power in this study, we did not conduct an omnibus test to detect 
interactions of diagnosis and the proposed mediators. Instead, we conducted two analyses 




However, given the exploratory nature of the current study, we examined the 
correlations of risk behavior change score and executive functioning change score (Table 
5) with the hopes of identifying a potential neurocognitive correlate of distress-induced 
increases in risk behavior. Within the BPD group, change in BART and change in percent 
perseverative errors were modestly positively correlated, r(11) = .22, p < .50. This 
indicates that larger BART change scores, which reflect higher risk behavior in the 
distress condition compared to the neutral condition, correspond to larger perseverative 
error change scores, which reflect higher rates of error in the distress condition compared 
to the neutral condition. Although this relationship did not approach significance, the 
degree of association corresponds to a small effect size (Cohen, 1988), and may have 
been meaningful in a larger sample. 
In addition, an examination of correlations within the BPD group revealed a 
surprisingly robust relationship between baseline executive functioning and risk behavior 
in the neutral condition, r(10) =.70, p < .017, and in the distress condition, r(10) = .57, p 
<.078. This suggests that, within the BPD group, poorer baseline executive functioning is 
associated with greater engagement in risk behavior, regardless of affect.   
Our next exploratory aim was to examine whether group differences in risk 
behavior in the distress condition would be mediated by group differences in executive 
functioning at baseline (i.e., non-affective executive functioning) and in the distress 
condition (i.e., affective executive functioning). To test this, we conducted a hierarchical 
regression to formally test mediation (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Judd and Kenny, 1981). 
Diagnosis significantly predicted risk behavior in the distress condition, β = .44, t(28) = 




was met. Consistent with our previous analyses, there was a main effect of diagnosis on 
baseline executive functioning, β = .36, t(29) = -2.07, p = .048, such that diagnosis 
predicted significantly better baseline executive functioning in the BPD group. However, 
there was not a main effect of diagnosis on distressed executive functioning, β = .27, 
t(28) = -1.46, p = .16. Therefore, the next condition for mediation was tested for baseline 
executive functioning only.  To test the third condition for mediation, we regressed risk 
behavior in the distress condition on baseline executive functioning, however, this step 
was not significant (β = .08, t(29) = .43, p = .67). Therefore, findings did not support 
affective or non-affective functioning as a mediator of the relationship between 





Chapter 4: Discussion 
4.1 Summary of Main Findings 
The current study examined the effect of induced distress on a behavioral measure 
of risk behavior and a test of executive functioning in a community sample of women 
with and without BPD. Previous clinical research that has established distress as a critical 
antecedent of engagement in risk behavior among individuals with BPD (Linehan, 1993; 
Brown et al., 2002; Chapman, Gratz & Brown, 2006), however, many of these studies 
have been limited in scope by their use of retrospective self-report methods. In contrast, a 
small number of studies have examined risk behavior in BPD using laboratory-based 
behavioral assessment (Coffey et al., 2010; McCloskey et al., 2009), but this work has 
not accounted for the role of negative affect in precipitating risk behavior in this clinical 
population. The current study builds upon earlier research by comparing risk behavior in 
neutral mood to risk behavior in the context of induced distress using a behavioral risk 
task. Within this novel experimental framework, it also became possible to test a 
neurocognitive model of risk behavior, to identify executive functioning variables that 
might explain the relationships among distress and risk behavior among individuals with 
and without BPD. To do this, we examined within-subject changes in risk behavior and 
executive functioning, as well as group differences in risk behavior and executive 
functioning.  
 In support of the primary study hypothesis, affect was found to moderate the 
relationship of diagnosis and engagement of risk behavior. Specifically, participants with 
BPD showed greater risk behavior in the distress condition than in the neutral condition, 




in the neutral condition. Furthermore, the two groups did not differ in risk behavior in the 
neutral condition, but the BPD group exhibited significantly greater risk behavior than 
controls in the distress condition. Taken together, results suggest that the BPD group 
responded to distress by engaging in risk behavior, whereas controls responded to distress 
by engaging in less risk behavior.   
Our results are consistent with clinical research, which implicate distress-induced 
risk behavior as a central characteristic of BPD (APA, 2000; Sansone, 1998; Selby, 
Anestis, Blender & Joiner, 2008; Levine, Marziali & Hood, 1997; Gratz et a., 2006; 
Bornovalova, Gratz, Daughters, Nick, Delaney-Brumsey, Lynch et al., 2008; 
Bornovalova, Matusiewicz & Riggs, in press). Theoretical accounts of risk behavior in 
BPD suggest a number of factors that may explain the effect of distress on engagement in 
risk behavior among individuals with BPD, as well as the factors that may account for 
distinct patterns of risk behavior observed among individuals with BPD, as compared to 
controls  (Linehan, 1993; Selby & Joiner, 2009; Chapman et al., 2006; Zanarini et al., 
2003; Allen, 1995; Depue & Lenzenweger, 2001). The experimental paradigm presented 
here may be useful to test any number of hypotheses about the factors underlying these 
relationships. The current study focused on neurocognitive mechanisms that might 
explain the effect of distress on risk behavior engagement in BPD, and account for group 
differences (BPD, non-BPD) in distress-induced risk behavior.     
As noted above, we identified a significant effect of affect on risk behavior among 
participants with BPD. Therefore, our first set of exploratory analyses examined whether 
distress-induced changes in risk behavior could be explained by corresponding changes 




executive functioning, so we did not proceed with a formal test of mediation (Judd, 
Kenny & McClelland, 2001). However, as a result of the small sample, the observed 
power to detect a main effect of affect on executive functioning was low, so we also 
examined associations among executive functioning variables and risk behavior to 
identify potential relationships within the BPD group for exploration in future studies. 
Two findings warrant mention. First, there was a modest, non-significant relationship 
between change in risk behavior and change in executive functioning (r = .22). This 
suggests that distress-induced deterioration in executive functioning was modestly 
associated with distress-induced increases in risk behavior. Of course, given the non-
significant association between these variables, the relationship must not be over-
interpreted, however, the observed relationship is consistent with the predictions of our 
theoretical model. Although the current findings do not provide support for executive 
functioning as a mediator of the effect of affect on risk behavior among participants with 
BPD, further research is warranted to determine the nature of the relationship between 
distress-induced decrements in executive functioning and distress-related increases in risk 
behavior.  
In addition, inspection of our correlation table revealed an unexpectedly robust 
correlation between executive functioning at baseline and subsequent engagement in risk 
behavior in the neutral condition (r = .70) and the distress condition (r = .57) within the 
BPD group. Results suggest that, among participants with BPD, poorer executive 
functioning at baseline (i.e., nonaffective deficits) are associated with engagement in risk 
behavior, regardless of affective state. These findings are consistent with previous work 




functioning engage in more under-controlled behavior than those high in executive 
functioning (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Yarkoni & Braver, 2010; Brand et al., 2006). That 
is, individuals with higher executive functioning are better able to act in accordance with 
their long-term goals, whereas those with poorer executive functioning are more likely to 
behave in accordance with their immediate impulses and desires (Hofmann, 
Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers & Schmitt, 2008). It has been suggested that this occurs 
because individuals with poor executive functioning are less able to keep two 
simultaneous goals active in working memory, which leads them to pursue whichever 
goal is active in that moment (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Although preliminary, these 
findings suggest that individual differences in non-affective executive functioning may 
have important implications for understanding engagement in risk behavior or individuals 
with BPD. 
 Our next set of analyses focused on neurocognitive factors associated with group 
differences in risk behavior in the distress condition. That is, we attempted to understand 
whether the relationship between diagnosis and distress-induced risk behavior could be 
explained by executive functioning deficits, either at baseline or when distressed. Results 
did not support the executive functioning variables as mediators of the relationship 
between diagnosis and distress-induced risk behavior. However, unexpectedly, the BPD 
group had a significantly lower rate of perseverative errors than the non-BPD group at 
baseline (BPD: 17%; non-BPD: 30%), and a marginally lower rate in the distress 
condition (BPD: 22%; non-BPD: 32%). This finding was surprising, as some studies have 
reported higher rates of perseverative errors among individuals with BPD, while others 




2006). To our knowledge this is the first study to find superior executive functioning 
among individuals with BPD. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the groups did not differ 
significantly on any other performance indices (these findings were not presented 
because they were not directly relevant to the proposed analyses). Thus, findings suggest 
that the non-BPD group had a specific deficit in set-shifting relative to the BPD group, 
which could not be explained by demographic (e.g., age or education) or clinical 
variables measured in this study (Boone et al., 1993; Heaton et al., 1993; Compton et al., 
1997). Additional work is needed to replicate this finding, and identify the sample 
characteristics or contexts in which individuals with BPD perform better than those 
without BPD.   
In summary, the current study used two complementary approaches to identify 
neurocognitive mediators of the relationship between affect and risk behavior among 
individuals with and without BPD. First, we examined within-subject variability in 
executive functioning within the BPD group to determine whether intra-individual 
fluctuations correspond to distress-induced changes in risk behavior.  Then, we examined 
group differences in executive functioning in relation to distress-induced risk behavior in 
the BPD and non-BPD groups. Overall, we did not find evidence that neurocognitive 
factors mediated any of the relationships of interest. Nonetheless, preliminary findings 
from the current study suggest the potential utility of these complementary approaches in 
understanding risk behavior in BPD. Future research is warranted to further explore the 
relationship of neurocognitive factors to risk behavior and other BPD symptom domains 




4.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
Findings of the current study should be interpreted in light of its limitations.  
4.2.1 Sampling Considerations 
A clear limitation of the current study is its modest sample size. In the initial 
power analysis, it was determined that a sample of 80 participants would provide 
adequate power to detect the presence of a between-group moderating variable and a 
within-group mediating variable. Unfortunately, it was not possible to recruit a sample of 
this size within the proposed timeframe. Despite low statistical power, the current sample 
was large enough to detect an interaction of diagnosis and condition in predicting risk 
behavior, however, both power and measurement issues precluded was not sufficient to 
test a neurocognitive mediator of this effect.  
An additional limitation of the current study concerns the generalizability of 
findings to other BPD samples. With regard to demographic characteristics, a number of 
choices were made to limit within group variability, while maintaining external validity. 
For instance, rates of BPD are equivalent among men in women in community samples 
(Grant et al., 2006), suggesting the importance of studying emotional responding and risk 
processes in both men and women. However, findings suggest that men tend to be riskier 
than women on behavioral risk measures (Hunt, Hopko, Bare, Lejuez & Robinson, 2005; 
Borghams, Golsteyn & Meijers, 2009; d'Acremont & Van der Linden, 2006), introducing 
a possible source of variance unrelated to either diagnosis or the experimental 
manipulation. Although we considered examining gender as a covariate, or even as a 
moderator, we ultimately decided to focus our recruitment efforts on women given 




limited our sample to women under the age of 35, in light of findings that the risky, self-
destructive behavior characteristic of BPD peaks between the ages of 15 and 40 (Welch, 
2001 Suyemoto, 1998; Stevenson, Meares & Comerford, 2003; Jarvis, Ferrence, Johnson 
& Whitehead, 1976). As a result, our findings do not necessarily generalize to men or 
older women with BPD, although the current sample does reflect a clinically meaningful 
subset of individuals with BPD. 
Our next set of choices related to issues surrounding psychiatric comorbidity.  
Given high rates of co-occurring psychiatric disorders in BPD samples (Stein et al., 2007; 
Bender et al., 2001; Zanarini et al., 1998) we were concerned excluding these participants 
would reduce external validity, however, a number of psychiatric disorders are associated 
with impairment in neurocognitive functioning (Elliot et al., 1996; Schatzburg et al., 
2000; Merriam et al., 1999), which complicate interpretation of findings (i.e., whether 
observed deficits result from BPD or impairment related to other psychiatric disorders; 
Sprock et al., 2001). Therefore, excluded individuals with current (i.e., past month) major 
depressive disorder and current (i.e., past year) substance dependence as well as 
individuals with history of bipolar I/II disorder or psychotic symptoms in light of 
evidence of persistent neurocognitive impairment associated with these disorders (Porter 
et al., 2003; Moritz et al., 2002; Degl'Innocenti et al., 2007; Sax et al., 1999; Clark et al., 
2002; Nieuwenstein et al., 2001; Krabbendam et al., 2000; Goldberg et al., 1993).  We 
chose to include individuals with remitted major depression and substance dependence as 
findings suggest that neurocognitive dysfunction associated with these disorders subsides 
within weeks to months (Miller, 1985; Bates et al., 2005; Austin, Goodwin & Mitchell, 




participants may have been somewhat less clinically severe than other BPD samples. 
Indeed, with the exception of substance use disorders, our BPD group reported 
substantially lower lifetime rates of psychopathology than what is typically reported in 
population-based studies of BPD (Grant et al., 2006). Findings from this community 
sample should not be considered representative of clinical BPD populations more 
generally. Additional research is needed to determine how psychiatric comorbidity 
influences emotional responding, cognitive functioning and risk behavior in BPD.  
4.2.2. Measurement Considerations 
In addition to issues related to the small sample size and low power, measurement 
issues may account for the lack of findings with regard to executive functioning. 
Although we had a number of reasons for choosing this measure of executive 
functioning, including consistency with our theoretical model and precedent in earlier 
research (Barcelo & Nyhus, 2009 Fertuck et al., 2006; Ruocco, 2006), the WCST may 
not have been the optimal measure for assessing executive functioning in this study. The 
WCST is limited by of relatively low test-retest stability and significant practice effects 
over multiple administrations (Spreen & Strauss, 1997; Paolo et al., 1996). Although we 
attempted to control for practice effects experimentally (Collie et al., 2003), the low test-
retest stability of WCST makes it difficult to determine what effects are due to the 
experimental manipulation, and which are due to measurement error. For example, 
because test-retest instability is high, it has been suggested that a reliable deterioration in 
performance would require an increase of 21 perseverative errors from baseline (Herman 
et al., 1996). In our sample, this corresponds to a 3-fold increase in perseverative errors. 




changes in cognitive functioning. In light of this issue, our failure to identify distress-
induced changes in executive functioning is not surprising.  
A related concern is that set shifting ability (as measured by perseverative errors 
on WCST) is not an ideal operationalization of cognitive control, the construct we 
intended to assess. Recent research suggests that cognitive control may be better-assessed 
by specific measures of working memory capacity (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & 
Cohen, 2001; Derrfuss, Brass & von Cramon, 2004; McDonald, Cohen, Stenger & 
Carver, 2000; Baddeley & Logie, 1999), rather than by global indicators of prefrontal 
functioning such as WCST. Conceptually, low working memory capacity may interfere 
with an individual’s ability represent two simultaneous goals in working memory (e.g., 
the goal of alleviating hunger vs. the goal of remaining slim; the goal of emotion 
regulation vs. the goal of sobriety). Indeed, individual differences and experimentally 
induced fluctuations in working memory capacity both have been shown to correspond to 
increased engagement in dysregulated behavior among healthy participants (e.g., 
Robinson, Schmeichel & Inzlicht, 2010; Kopetz et al., in preparation). Therefore, future 
research on neurocognition in BPD should employ well-established measures of working 
memory capacity, which have been shown to reliably detect modest changes over 
multiple administrations (e.g., the N-back task; Xu, Mendrek, Cohen, Monterosso, Simon 
et al., 2006; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). 
In addition, it is noteworthy that our approach to measure affective 
neurocognition was somewhat atypical. Our study examined processing of neutral stimuli 
in an affectively aroused state, whereas previous work has assessed processing of 




generally (e.g., Yen et al., 2002; Fertuck et al., 2006). Although both approaches have 
shown that negative affect or negative emotion cues are associated with decrements in 
executive functioning (compared to neutral affect/cues; Fertuck et al., 2006; Chepenik, 
Cornew & Farah, 2006), our approach may not have been sufficient to induce significant 
changes, particularly using the WCST. This task involves lower order cognitive processes 
(e.g., working memory, behavioral inhibition) as well as higher-order cognitive processes 
(e.g., conceptual reasoning), which may be affected differently by emotion (Nyhus & 
Barcelo, 2009).  Therefore, future research should employ more conventional 
experimental paradigms for assessing affective neurocognition, and should use a 
combination of tasks that assess higher- and lower-order executive functions.  
4.2.3. Experimental Considerations 
Finally, although the mood manipulation was sufficient to produce the 
hypothesized changes in risk behavior in the BPD group, several limitations warrant 
mention. First, despite the significant change in negative affect from pre- to post-distress 
script, the distress induction produced only mild levels of distress. For both groups, the 
negative affect composite score corresponded to feeling “a little” distressed following the 
distress manipulation. These effects are comparable to other studies that used 
personalized distress imagery scripts with participants with BPD (e.g., Schmal, Elzinga, 
Ebner, Simms, Sanislow et al., 2004; Kraus, Valerius, Seifritz, Ruf, Bremner et al., 
2010), however, these relatively modest effects may not be sufficient to produce 
meaningful changes executive functioning (Williams, Suchy & Rau, 2009; Pessoa, 2009).  
One possible explanation for the modest observed effect is that the study protocol 




emotions before engaging in the tasks. As a manipulation check, participants completed a 
questionnaire that asked them to rate the intensity of 20 different emotion words 
immediately after hearing the distress script (PANAS). This questionnaire, which asked 
participants to observe, differentiate and label their emotions, may have functioned as an 
exercise in emotion regulation (Gratz & Tull, 2010). While the emotion regulating 
properties of the PANAS remain an empirical question, it is possible that this aspect of 
the design made the distress induction less effective, which limited our ability to detect 
affect-linked changes in risk behavior and executive functioning. Future research may 
consider dispensing with subjective mood ratings in favor of objective measures of 
emotional responding (e.g., psychophysiological measures such as heart rate variability, 
blood pressure, skin conductance; Schmal et al., 2004).  
  Another potential limitation of our affect manipulation was that it aimed to 
increase distress generally, rather than targeting specific emotional states that are known 
to be associated with engagement in risk behavior. For instance, recent research suggests 
that interpersonal distress (e.g., feelings of abandonment, disapproval or rejection) has a 
unique association with engagement in risk behavior for those with BPD (Stanley, 2010; 
Sadikaj, Russel, Moskowitz & Paris, 2010). Thus, future research may employ affect 
manipulations that specifically target stressful interpersonal experiences instead of other 
distressing events. Along these lines, several studies of emotional responding in BPD 
have used personalized abandonment scripts (e.g., Schmal et al., 2003, 2004), however 
evidence does not suggest that interpersonally-oriented distress scripts are more effective 
than general distress scripts for individuals with BPD (e.g., Schmal et al., 2004). Another 




nature, such as Cyberball (Williams, 2006), a computerized ball-tossing game in which 
the participant is systematically excluded from a group interaction. Addressing these 
methodological concerns related to the affect induction procedure may provide a more 
robust test of the effect of affect on risk behavior and executive functioning.  
4.2.4. Future Directions 
 The preceding sections we identified a number of methodological factors that may 
have interfered with our ability to detect the presence of mediating variables. However, in 
the absence of conclusive findings to support the neurocognitive model of risk behavior, 
it is also appropriate to consider alternative theories of risk behavior in BPD.  
Our findings regarding affect and risk behavior are consistent with prominent 
behavioral theories of risk behavior in BPD, which emphasize that the motivational basis 
of risk behavior is the regulation of negative affect (e.g., Linehan, 1993; Chapman et al., 
2006; Selby & Joiner, 2009). These theories suggest that individuals with BPD engage in 
risk behavior because they experience intense negative affect, and have low ability or 
willingness tolerance of distress, which leads them to engage in behaviors that decrease 
distress in the short-term, even though these behaviors may also lead to negative 
consequences and interfere with other goals (Linehan, 1993; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). 
Compared to individuals with BPD, those without BPD may experience less intense 
negative affect, feel less need to reduce distress when it occurs, or have access to more 
adaptive means of emotion regulation (Levine, Marziali & Hood, 1997; Gratz et a., 2006; 
Bornovalova, Gratz, Daughters, Nick, Delaney-Brumsey, Lynch et al., 2008; 
Bornovalova, Matusiewicz & Riggs, in press), and therefore engage in less risk behavior 




accounted for the pattern of findings that we observed, yet the current study was not 
designed to test these hypotheses.  Future research could examine these hypotheses using 
the current experimental paradigm in combination with existing self-report, behavioral 
and physiological measures of emotion regulation (e.g., Watson et al., 1988; Lejuez et al., 
2002; Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  
 A central tenet of emotion regulation theories of risk behavior is that risk behavior 
is maintained through negative reinforcement, yet there is there is considerable evidence 
that risk behavior is also maintained by positive reinforcement processes. As example, 
self-harm may function to reduce negative affect (e.g., feelings of tension, shame, 
sadness) or to escape an aversive situation (Brown et al., 2002; Nock & Prinstein, 2005). 
However, the same behavior may also be used to generate feelings (e.g., terminate 
dissociative states) or influence others’ behavior (e.g., elicit support, increase 
compliance, or even as an act of self-validation (Brown et al., 2002). Positive and 
negative reinforcement functions of other risk behaviors (e.g., substance use, bulimic 
behavior, impulsive sexual behavior, suicidal behavior) have also been identified (Baker, 
McCarthy, Piper McCarthy, Majeskie & Fiore, 2004; Koob & Kreek, 2007; Wedig & 
Nock, 2010; Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999). Furthermore, within individuals, different risk 
behaviors may be maintained by distinct motivational processes, and the function of any 
specific risk behavior may change over time (Brown et al., 2002). Accordingly, future 
should explore a combination of positive and negative reinforcement processes in 
attempting to model actual risk behavior, acknowledging that the functions of any 




 Finally, our results indicate that the BPD and non-BPD groups exhibited different 
patterns of behavior in response to distress: the BPD group engaged in more risk behavior 
when distressed, while the non-BPD group showed less risk behavior. This finding is 
consistent with previous research, which suggests that healthy female participants engage 
in less risk behavior in the context of distress than under no-stress conditions (Lighthall, 
Mather & Gorlick, 2009; Preston, Tansfield, Bechanan & Bechara, 2007). The pattern of 
behavior observed in the BPD group is noteworthy, because not only did they show an 
increase in the distress condition, but they actually showed the opposite behavioral 
pattern than what is observed in healthy samples. The factors that contribute to these 
distinct patterns of responding remain unclear. One possibility is that the BPD group may 
have experienced an intense desire to decrease distress, and so may have attempted to 
repair their mood by seeking rewards. On the other hand, non-BPD may have been 
motivated to avoid a further deterioration in mood, and behaved more conservatively to 
avoid incurring losses. Continued research is warranted to determine the motivational and 
neurocognitive processes involved in the tendency to become risk seeking versus risk 
averse in the context of distress.  
 
4.3. Conclusions 
The application of neuropsychological and biobehavioral findings to clinically 
relevant outcomes has been identified as a priority in research on BPD (Bohus, 2010). 
Despite a number of limitations, the current study represents a unique contribution to the 
empirical literature on risk behavior in BPD. This study extends previous research by 




range of potential processes associated with risk behavior than has been allowed by 
retrospective self-report studies. Along these lines, an exploratory aim of this study was 
to examine affective deficits in executive functioning as they related to engagement in 
distress-induced risk behavior. Although we did not find support for our proposed 
neurocognitive mediators, our results indicate several avenues for future research. In 
addition, the experimental paradigm used in this study may have applications in future 
research examining the relationship of neurocognitive vulnerabilities to clinically 











Eligible for Study 
N = 69 
No-Show 
n = 21 
Completed 1st Session 
n  =  48 
BPD 
n  =  16 
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Data  
n = 1 
 
Non-BPD 
n  =  32 
Completed All Sessions 
n  =  14 
Completed All Sessions 
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Lost to 
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Included in Analyses 
n  =  19 
Psychiatric 
Rule Out 
n  = 3 
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n = 12 
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 p = .01 













Non-BPD (n = 19) 
______________ 
 
Age M = 21.5  ±  3.6 
 
M = 22.6  ±   4.6 
 
Racial/ethnic background 
     White 
     Black or African American 
     Asian or Asian American 












Highest Educational Attainment    
      High school  
      Some college 
      College  











Psychiatric Treatment (Lifetime) 27.3% 31.6% 
Axis I disorders 
     Mood disorder (Lifetime)* 
     Substance use disorder (Lifetime) 
     Anxiety disorder (Lifetime) 











Note. BPD = borderline personality disorder 





Table ii. Ratings of Negative Affect and Positive Affect Before and After the Affect 
Manipulation in Each Condition, as a Function of Diagnosis.  
 
 
    
BPD (N = 11) 
______________ 
 




Condition Time M (SD) M (SD) 
Negative Affect 
Neutral 
Pre 1.66 (.80) 1.22 (.29) 
Post 1.75 (.95) 1.39 (.65) 
Distress 
Pre 1.53 (.77) 1.25 (.37) 
Post 2.35 (1.16) 1.69 (.69) 
     
Positive Affect 
Neutral 
Pre 2.42 (.65) 2.77 (.74) 
Post 2.47 (.75) 2.41 (.75) 
Distress 
Pre 2.87 (1.05) 2.86 (.88) 
Post 2.33 (1.01) 2.32 (1.01) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. BPD = borderline personality disorder 













Non-BPD (n = 19) 
______________ 








Note. BART = Balloon Analogue Risk Task adjusted average pumps per balloon;  BPD = 
borderline personality disorder 





Table iv. Descriptive Data for Executive Functioning as a Function of Diagnostic Group 








(n = 19) 
__________ 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
Persev. Errors (%):  Baseline 
Persev. Errors (%):  Neutral 















Table v. Point Biserial and Pearson Correlations Between Diagnostic Status, Risk 
Behavior and Executive Functioning in Participants with BPD (below the diagonal) and 
without BPD (above the diagonal) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Diagnostic status  (combined) 
 
.18 .44* .56** -.39* -.41* -.27 .05 
1. BART: Neutral 
 
 .94** -.40 .15 .25 .20 .01 
2. BART: Distress 
 
.87**  -.05 .14 .27 .08 -.11 
3. ΔBART  
 
-.10 .40  .05 .01 -.34 -.30 
4. Persev. Errors (%): Baseline 
 
.71* .57 -.19  .38 .38 .04 
5. Persev. Errors (%): Neutral 
 
.22 .17 -.06 .21  .31 -.45 
6. Persev. Errors (%): Distress 
 
-.05 -.02 .04 .43 .60  .68** 
7. ΔPersev. Errors (%) 
 
-.36 -.22 .22 .14 -.55 .32  
Note: Correlations for participants with BPD are presented below the diagonal, and 
correlations for controls are above the diagonal. BART = Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
adjusted average pumps per balloon. ΔBART = the difference between BART score in 
the distress condition and in the neutral condition, with higher scores reflecting greater 
risk behavior in the distress condition. Persev. Errors (%) = Percentage perseverative 
errors out of total errors. ΔPersev. Errors (%) =  the difference between rate of 
perseverative errors in the distress condition and in the neutral condition, with higher 
scores reflecting more errors in the distress condition 
* p  <  .05 








Appendix I: Sample Distress Imagery Script 
You will soon hear a situation being described to you. Your task is to close your eyes and 
imagine yourself in the situation being described, ‘as if’ it were happening right now. 
Allow yourself to become completely involved in the situation, by involving your mind 
and body in actually doing what is being described. Continue imagining until you are 
asked to stop. 
 
You are taking a shower when suddenly you realize that you are washing off the last 
remnants of your relationship with your ex-boyfriend. You get choked up as you think 
about the fact that you won’t even be able to smell him anymore. There’s a lump in your 
throat and you feel like crying. You can’t stop missing him so much. There’s a knot in 
your stomach. You two were perfect together and now it’s all over. Your chest feels tight 
and it gets harder to breath. He might as well be on another planet because you’re never 
going to see or talk to him again. Your breathing becomes fast and labored. You feel like 
Juliette, like everything that should have been right got ruined by circumstance. Your 
eyes burn with tears. Mormonism took him away from you. You could have been 
together except he couldn’t convert for you and you couldn’t convert for him. Your 
whole body is shaking. You’re afraid to be alone now. It hurts to be alive. You can’t stop 
the thoughts from coming. Your heart keeps beating faster. You’re remembering how you 
two had to sneak around. You hated having to do that. You’re remembering how you 
couldn’t tell him you love him because you knew he wouldn’t say “I love you” back. 
Now you’re gasping for air. You’re remembering how he kissed another girl. You felt 




if only you had insisted on making the relationship public. But you feared his refusal. His 
parents never liked you because you’re atheist. He tried to blame you for what he called 
“leading him astray”. You want to scream or hit someone. The end was inevitable and 
now it’s real. You knew all along that he was going to leave you. There’s nothing you 
can do about it. But it still hurts so much. You grit your teeth. Being with him was like a 
drug. You can’t stand it. You hate how nothing is more important than his religion. You 
don’t understand why he won’t break free from it. His sister did and it was fine, so why 
won’t he? You know he has doubts about his religion, so why did he choose to leave 
you? You feel like you don’t matter to him at all. He could always make you feel better, 
but now he’s gone and the hurt won’t stop. You feel empty and drained except for the 
intense pain deep inside. 
 
Stop imagining now 
Open your eyes and stop imagining 
Now please complete the questionnaire on the top shelf to your right. When you are 




Appendix II: Sample Neutral Imagery Script  
You will soon hear a situation being described to you. Your task is to close your eyes 
and imagine yourself in the situation being described, ‘as if’ it were happening right now. 
Allow yourself to become completely involved in the situation, by involving your mind 
and body in actually doing what is being described. Continue imagining until you are 
asked to stop. 
 
You are sitting on the beach on a bright summer day. You breathe in deeply as you notice 
a red kite against the cloudless blue sky. Your eyes trace the path of the kite as it whips 
up and down in spirals with the wind. The sun glares at you from behind the kite and 
makes the white sandy beach sparkle with reflection. You tense the muscles in your 
forehead and around your eyes, squinting to block out the bright sunlight. You follow 
with your eyes the long white tail, which dances from side to side beneath the soaring 
kite. You take in a few deep breaths of the fresh ocean air, noticing the smells of the fish 
and the salt water. The warm sun beats down against your skin and a light gentle breeze 
blows over you. You listen to the soothing sound of the ocean waves, roaring and  
splashing as it comes onto the sand, and quiet as the water goes back out to sea. You 
relax the muscles in your arms, back and legs as you lay back on the sand, feeling the soft 
fine granules of sand between your toes and fingers. The tension from your body goes 
down and you feel comfortable and at ease. Your breathing slows down and the worry 
thoughts seem to fade away. There is a sense of lightness and you want to hold time and 





 Stop imagining now 
Open your eyes and stop imagining 
Now please complete the questionnaire on the top shelf to your right. When you are 
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